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The Editorial on the Research Topic
How Humans Recognize Objects: Segmentation, Categorization and Individual Identification
What does it mean to say that something is an object? How do we recognize objects as such, picking
them out from any non-objects that might happen to be present? What, indeed, does it mean to say
that something is not an object? Is it even possible to recognize a non-object?
What, moreover, does it mean to say that something is a specific, individual object. Suppose you
are handed 10 brand-new 1 e coins, each of which looks and feels exactly like the others. How do
we recognize one of them as exactly the same individual 1e coin we were looking at a moment ago?
How does this process change if we’ve looked away for a few seconds, a minute, an hour? What if
we have not seen the coin since last year? How does the individual recognition process change if,
instead of coins, we are talking about 10 new colleagues encountered at a meeting 1 year ago?
The “what does it mean” versions of these questions have been with us since antiquity, in the
form of philosophical musings about the nature of or evidence for an external world. The “how”
versions have been asked for slightly over a century, and a detailed picture has begun to emerge
only in the past two decades. Schneider’s (1969) suggestion that two distinct pathways support
visual orientation toward object features and locations was a watershed event in this growing
understanding (see Goodale and Milner, 1992 for an early review). Research stemming from this
idea has inextricably linked object recognition to the experiences of space, time, and persistence
over time, i.e., individual identity (see Scholl, 2007; Fields, 2012 for review). Without a spacetime
“container” and individual, time-persistent objects, motion and causation cannot be defined; hence
object recognition underlies these experiences as well.
The papers in this Research Topic provide a glimpse of the current state of understanding the
“how” of object recognition. Beginning with themost concrete, Taylor et al. review the development
of contour detection and integration in humans, relating the functional trajectory from infancy
to adolescence to the increasing range of horizontal connectivity within areas V1 and V2 during
the same period. Kosilo et al. then describe new experiments designed to tease apart the effects
of low-level (color and contrast) and high-level (identifiability as an object) stimulus features on
the control of visual saccades. Schendan and Ganis show that object recognition exerts top-down
effects on visual processing within 250ms; Caplette et al. demonstrate the influence of top-down
affective and contextual expectations on the precision with which objects are represented. Anzellotti
and Caramazza review evidence suggesting that human face identity is selectively encoded in the
right-hemisphere anterior temporal pole (ATP), an area generally implicated in semantic memory.
Orban et al. review the functional anatomy of the ventral stream, and suggest that fully-defined
individual entities of all types are represented in ATP.
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Lacey and Sathian review visuo-haptic integration, focusing
on the role of lateral occipital cortex (LOC); Kassuba et al.
describe downstream effects on visual and haptic processing
following disruption of LOC activity by transcranial magnetic
stimulation. Maranesi et al. review the representation of motor
affordances and their activation by object recognition, while
Schubotz et al. present new results on the representation of action
expectations. Schlesinger et al. address the key question of how
infants learn to generate expectations that predict the behavior of
the visual world.
The remaining five papers address fundamental theoretical
issues. Grossberg et al. address the question of scene stability
across eye movements using the Adaptive Resonance Theory
framework. Bruza and Chang investigate the utility of quantum
probabilities for explaining relevance judgments. Aerts reviews
quantum theory itself, explaining why it renders the existence of
the separate, bounded entities that we call “objects” mysterious.
Klein examines the human perception of a time-persistence self
and suggests that sameness is a pre-evidential “default mode” of
the self representation. Hoffman and Prakash review evidence
suggesting that neither objects nor their spacetime “container”
objectively exist, but must instead be considered to be emergent
from multi-agent interactions.
Beyond the leading edge represented by these papers
lie questions for further research, many of which concern
the development, especially during early infancy, of object-
recognition capabilities. Three of the most significant, in my
opinion, are the following.
1. How malleable are the human representations of space
and time? Are particular motor capabilities essential to the
development of these representations? What is the role of
sensory-motor correlations in representing perceived space?
Would an organism inhabiting a world devoid of manipulable
objects be able to develop a 3d spatial representation?
Recent developments in quantum theory have led to a new
emphasis among physicists on reference frames as physical
objects, not just abstract coordinate systems, with respect to
which quantities are measured: examples include clocks and
gyroscopes used as reference frames to measure time and
spatial orientation, respectively (Bartlett et al., 2007).What are
the earliest-developing reference frames for space and time in
humans? By what age do infants perceive objects as embedded
in a containing space that imposes relationships upon them,
as opposed to just perceiving objects?
2. How do causal reasoning and object recognition ability co-
develop? Is there some particular level of predictability that is
required? What kind of predictability—predictable locations
or motions, predictable static features, or both? What would
happen in an environment in which the predictability of
locations andmotions was uncorrelated with the predictability
of static features?
Any object that serves as a reference frame must be
unproblematically recognizable as such: a clock, for example,
can only serve as a clock if its identity over time is not
in question. What level of predictability must the infant
environment have in order for typical space and time reference
frames to develop? What level of predictability must it have
in order for typical object categories to develop? What
happens in environments with less than this critical level of
predictability?
3. How does the subjectively-accessible sense of the body as
a time-persistent object and hence of the stably-embodied
self develop? Rochat (2012) suggests that a rudimentary
embodied-self representation is present at birth. How is this
representation implemented? How is this implementation
constructed prenatally?
If Hoffman and Prakash are right in stating that a shared
external world of objectively-defined objects cannot be
assumed, the infant’s representation of itself and its capabilities
for action becomes the only reference frame from which
a perceived world of persistent objects can be constructed.
What level of coherence must the world provide, whatever its
structure, for this process of construction to be feasible?
These questions cannot, clearly, be fully answered by experiments
with human infants. Combining experiments that are feasible
with infants with experiments carried out on validated
computational models, as in the work of Schlesinger et al.
promises to become even more important as questions such as
those contemplated here are addressed.
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